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The emergence of the fund of hedge funds (FoHF) was the natural evolutionary outcome of the appearance 
of the hedge fund itself and its consequential rapid rise to success as a result of offering absolute returns 
to a market where the generality of world savings was invested in relative returns. However, the lack of 
transparency, large minimum required investment and some early highly publicised accidents restricted 
access to this investment class mainly to high net worth individuals. To overcome this, the concept of 
packaging hedge funds into funds of hedge funds was born, though at ﬁ  rst with mainly institutional investors 
using these funds as providers of ill-deﬁ  ned alpha rather than introducing them into their portfolios as a 
particular style.
From this simple beginning, the role of the fund of hedge funds has evolved into today’s fully-ﬂ  edged 
multi-manager. This progression occurred naturally as the growing concern to identify more rigorously the 
type of risk from which hedge funds generated their returns and the need for managers to prove their added 
value meant that, increasingly, funds of hedge funds had to clarify their role in terms of risk management, 
asset allocation and reporting as they do today. A lack of experience, together with the complexity of risks 
to which hedge funds were exposed, highlighted both the importance of making a risk assessment prior 
to an investment, and the importance of risk management during the investment’s lifetime.
Despite a better understanding of risk exposures and alpha sources, building a well-diversiﬁ   ed 
multi-manager portfolio remains a difﬁ  cult task. However, due to their in-depth knowledge of alternative 
styles and their use of an investment process combining top-down asset allocation and bottom-up manager 
selection, funds of hedge funds have been able to build robust portfolios, generating absolute returns over 
the long term. Furthermore, capitalising on their ability to consolidate and interpret information from various 
hedge fund managers has allowed funds of hedge funds to produce meaningful reports for their investors.
Over the last few years, it has been thought that the huge inﬂ  ow of money into this universe would exhaust 
the source of alpha. However, this capacity constraint concern has since faded (to be replaced to a certain 
degree by manager constraints) and funds of hedge funds have been able to strengthen their role by 
providing secured access to a diversiﬁ  ed source of alpha as a result of their ability to identify, monitor and 
time risk factors.
The knowledge acquired in understanding and evaluating the role of skills in producing absolute returns 
has also proved to be of value when applied to the traditional space, and has contributed to broadening 
the added value of the managers’ institutional proposition. As funds of hedge funds have become 
fully-ﬂ  edged multi-managers in their own right, they are also now able to compete in the institutional sector 
with the traditional multi-manager.ARTICLES
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1| ORIGIN OF FUNDS
OF HEDGE FUNDS
The emergence of the fund of hedge funds was the 
natural evolutionary consequence of the appearance 
of the hedge fund itself and its rapid rise to success. 
During the 1980s, hedge fund capital grew by 
several hundreds of billions of dollars, offering 
absolute returns to a market where the generality of 
world savings was invested in relative return funds 
linked to traditional benchmarks. Fuelled by their 
superior performance, absolute returns generated 
by hedge funds went from 15% per annum (versus 
a balanced world index of 10%) in the 1980s to 19% 
(versus a balanced world index of 9%) in the 1990s. 
(see Chart 1)
On a risk-adjusted basis, absolute returns have 
performed four times better than relative returns 
–contrary to general belief. Even when the 
abnormality of absolute returns is included in the risk 
quantiﬁ  cation, investors who were used to evaluating 
their investment on a relative risk basis (i.e. on the 
risk of underperforming the traditional benchmark) 
recognised that relative risk had to be reconsidered 
in the evaluation of the probability of beneﬁ  ting from 
positive performance. This new attitude dramatically 
increased the attraction of absolute risk adjusted 
returns and of hedge funds. Mitigating this success, 
however, was the lack of transparency offered by the 
new breed of hedge fund managers, jealous to guard 
the secrets of their successes.
Inevitably all hedge fund managers were not born equal. 
Since 1993, several accidents (Granite CTA (1993),
LCTM (1998), Manhattan (2000) and more recently 
Bayou Capital (2005) and Amaranth (2006)), have 
made headlines that have sulphur-tainted the 
success story. Greed and fear played their roles in 
the selection of hedge funds and in the positioning 
of these investment vehicles in an optimum manner. 
Moreover, hedge funds broadly were reserved for 
high net worth clients able to make the minimum 
required investment of upwards of USD 500,000. 
These forces came together to spawn the creation 
a diversiﬁ  ed portfolio of hedge funds accessible to 
lower level uptake.
Hedge funds packaged into funds of funds were an 
evolutionary success story that led assets under 
management (AUM) to USD 42 billion by the end of 
1999, soaring to USD 972 billion by the end of 2006 
and to one trillion dollars today – 111% cumulative 
per annum growth over the period. (see Chart 2)
Packaging indeed it was, with added value from 
the manager consisting mainly in offering a simple 
diversiﬁ  cation and some mutualisation of the speciﬁ  c 
risk with an average number of investments amounting 
to between 10 – 25 different hedge funds. Such a 
simple construction led the managers to concentrate 
on investing in the larger and most successful hedge 
funds for which due diligence and evaluation of 
performance was easier to achieve than for younger, 
more specialised funds that did not offer a long track 
record. In other words, fund of fund managers were 
relying in most cases on the successful hedge funds 
to make their own offering attractive with little added 
value other than that of providing access to quality 
capacity. This had the immediate consequence of 
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fund of fund returns converging quickly to the mean 
return of hedge funds (less the fund of fund fees), 
with very little dispersion around the mean. Another 
consequence, less noticeable in the beginning but 
nonetheless consequential for the industry, was that 
institutional demand for these products resulted in 
lower fees as fund of funds were substantially similar 
and managers were not yet competing on added 
value. This situation led institutions, encouraged by 
consultants, to look at fund of funds as an asset class 
(as differences were not obviously identiﬁ  ed) and 
to introduce them into their otherwise traditional 
portfolios as providers of ill-deﬁ  ned alpha rather than 
introducing them as a style with the accompanying 
beneﬁ  ts in terms of asset allocation.
In other words, investing in alternative products 
consisted mainly in monitoring the tracking error 
of the traditional allocation model resulting from 
the introduction of absolute return.
This situation lasted until the early years of the 
present decade, when increasing concern over the 
need for the more rigorous identiﬁ  cation of the type 
of risk from which hedge funds generated their 
returns, as well as the growing need to stand out 
from the crowd and embrace the challenge of adding 
value in order to survive, began to take effect. To 
convert the fund of hedge funds business from a 
popular (albeit not well understood) fad into a solidly 
based industry, their role evolved from the original 
simple model to today’s fully-ﬂ  edged multi manager, 
allocating capital by strategy rather than by asset class 
or geography. Indeed, some time ago, as globalisation 
took effect, geography as a means of diversiﬁ  cation 
disappeared. At the same time, bonds and equities in 
the deﬂ  ationary boom cycle (such as the one we have 
been in since 1980) have been seriously correlated 
thus reducing signiﬁ  cantly the quality of a traditional 
balanced mandate. So, allocating capital to different 
hedge funds meant, de facto, allocating capital to 
different styles and strategies. With this, the role of 
a fund of hedge funds became clear –to select the 
best managers for the relevant style, ensuring quality 
of performance and capacity, as well as structuring 
the appropriate liquidity to allow for an optimum 
dynamic allocation process.
2| HEDGE FUND RISK
Hedge funds make the headlines with unfortunate 
regularity. High proﬁ   le collapses, generally 
accompanied by huge losses for investors and 
(less well-publicised) lengthy and costly legal 
engagements, are a well-travelled track.
Amaranth and Bayou Capital are two recent, 
notorious cases –though the causes of each collapse 
were very different. Amaranth, a respected 
multi-strategy American hedge fund, lost almost 
USD 10 billion from a single massive spread bet 
on energy futures that went against them. The 
loss was never recovered and the company ceased 
activity not long after. In the case of Bayou Capital, 
the company defrauded investors of half a billion 
dollars by manipulating illiquid security prices 
with the help of it own associated brokerage 
company.
These two examples illustrate the variety of risks to 
which a hedge fund investor is exposed. Fraud and 
market risk are not the only dangers. Because many 
hedge funds use signiﬁ  cant leverage in an effort to 
generate outsize returns, even a small investment 
management blunder can cause a massive implosion. 
A hedge fund is not a risk-free investment.
Risks are commonly divided into three categories: 
market risk, investment management risk and 
operational risk. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
estimates that around twenty hedge funds collapse 
every year. The majority of these appear to be the 
result of operational risk (fraud and/or inadequate 
resource and structure) and only around 40% to be 
the result of investment risk (e.g. market and/or 
investment management).
Since hedge funds operate in a lightly regulated 
environment, little prevents a fund manager from 
misleading his investors. The investor (or the multi 
manager) has to fully understand and accept these 
risks and carefully monitor them. Risk management 
has therefore to be present at every stage of the 
investment process, a process that generally starts ARTICLES
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with in depth due diligence (the initial risk assessment 
exercise applied to any candidate hedge fund). To this 
risk assessment is added a market risk analysis of the 
fund and its strategy.
The decision to invest in a hedge fund has to be 
accompanied by an effective monitoring process. 
This monitoring is only possible if a sufﬁ  cient level 
of transparency can be obtained from the hedge 
fund manager.
Provided that these conditions are met, the investor 
is in a good position to manage his allocation 
passively or dynamically according to his own mode 
of management.
3| DUE DILIGENCE
Due diligence is the voluntary investigation of the 
business, legal and operational aspects of managers 
targeted for investment. The depth of the due 
diligence exercise is entirely up to the hedge fund 
investor. As it is now commonly accepted that the 
process signiﬁ  cantly reduces the manager speciﬁ  c 
risk, proper due diligence is now considered as 
industry-standard by the great majority of fund of 
hedge fund managers.
Due diligence typically covers two main areas: the 
operational and legal set-up of the fund and of the 
management company, and the investment strategy 
and related risk management policy (if any). The 
ﬁ  rst of these will typically include a brief history 
of the ﬁ  rm, the principal biographies, the various 
service providers and how they interact as well as 
the level of responsibility and accountability of the 
various parties. The second is aimed at describing 
how a hedge fund produces its returns, the type 
of instrument traded, how they are traded, how 
the portfolio is constructed and what are the risk 
management policies.
A more thorough review can be made. The inclusion 
in the due diligence of the fund service provider 
(administrator and prime broker, auditors) can, for 
example, be beneﬁ  cial. This might enhance the 
independence of the pricing system (for illiquid 
securities) and other key factors in evaluating 
operational risk (e.g. ownership, stafﬁ  ng, execution 
procedures etc.).
Some companies would also include in their 
due diligence a principal background check and 
references (i.e. Securities and Exchange Commission 
ﬁ  lings, legal past or pending legal litigations).
A thorough due diligence should be an integral part 
of the process of investing in hedge funds and should 
never be overlooked or considered as a bureaucratic 
constraint. In the case of Bayou, proper due diligence 
would very likely have raised issues relating to the 
potential conﬂ  ict of interest brought about by the 
ownership link between the management company 
and its brokerage arm. However, due diligence 
would not have protected against the collapse 
of Amaranth.
Due diligence can also be used in the asset allocation 
process by limiting the exposure to hedge funds 
that appear weak operationally but still show great 
potential (i.e. start-up funds).
In depth due diligence may require the extensive 
use of resources and where a hedge fund, perhaps 
by design, has a short opening and closing period to 
raise capital, the individual investor has a limited 
time to make an informed decision. As experts, 
funds of hedge funds can help in this process by 
providing skills and infrastructures that contribute 
to the reduction of manager speciﬁ  c risk.
4| TRANSPARENCY
The hedge fund industry has a culture of 
(occasionally justiﬁ  ed) secrecy that poses problems 
for due diligence and risk monitoring. 
Hedge funds are under no obligation to disclose 
information to investors. However, growing pressure 
from institutional investors is gradually imposing 
new standards of transparency such as weekly 
pricing, exposure reports, sector allocation etc. There 
are still improvements to be made, in particular in 
areas such as offering memorandums that deﬁ  ne 
what a fund manager is allowed to do (as evident in 
recent discussions on PIPEs - private investments 
in public equity, side pockets and/or other complex 
fee or redemption term structures). Nonetheless, we 
have seen over the last few years signiﬁ  cant changes. 
In general, hedge fund managers are now willing to 
cooperate with a due diligence exercise.ARTICLES
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Full transparency, however, though conceptually 
appealing, poses its own questions. For instance, 
it is in everyone’s interest to keep the hedge fund 
manager’s competitive advantage quiet –if anyone 
wants it to remain so. Full transparency can erode 
a hedge fund’s competitive edge and precipitate 
the collapse of the vulnerable. Transparency risks 
generating a false sense of security in investor and 
regulator alike. Full and timely transparency did not 
lead to the raising of a red ﬂ  ag about Amaranth’s. Self 
evidently, hedge fund managers are remunerated 
for their ability to produce return and manage their 
speciﬁ  c risk and not for the data they provide to 
their investors. Amaranth’s dutiful registering with 
the SEC of their long exposure did not prevent 
its collapse. But to argue that increased investor 
transparency requirements have reduced hedge 
fund performance is probably to exaggerate.
Nonetheless, an investor reasonably needs to monitor 
the risk to which he is exposed and appropriate 
transparency can be achieved without compromising 
the proprietary nature of a hedge fund’s investment 
strategies. Disclosure can be limited to aggregated 
performance, exposures (long and short) and speciﬁ  c 
risk indicators (such as greeks, value-at-risk, margin 
to equity etc.). Some well-known quantitative third 
party risk management software providers now 
offer products and infrastructure that allow the 
fund manager and investors to share information 
without compromising conﬁ  dentiality. A minimum 
level of transparency should include performance/
risk attribution and contribution, broken down into 
meaningful categories (depending on the strategy), 
top exposures and strategy-speciﬁ  c risk measures.
Yet an investor can be rapidly overcome by the amount 
of information that needs regularly to be processed. 
This again is where fund of hedge funds can add value 
by providing skills and infrastructure to monitor 
investments and allocate capital accordingly.
5| RISK ASSESSMENT
A basic step in any alternative risk management 
process is to partition the universe of hedge funds into 
categories. In the alternative world, this partitioning 
exercise is generally driven by the manager’s skills 
that determine the investment style or strategy, rather 
than by the more traditional asset class or geography 
sector that is commonplace in the long-only space. 
This is well illustrated by alternative index vendors 
who publish monthly returns of risk arbitrage, 
long-short equity, convertible bond arbitrage etc.
A hedge fund investor must then be able to identify 
the drivers or risk and return of each strategy and 
sub-strategy. Various quantitative methods can be 
used to analyse and monitor the systematic exposure 
of each strategy –the most straightforward one being 
simple or multiple regression analysis.
In addition to traditional market exposure, hedge 
funds are also exposed to ‘alternative’ factors, 
e.g. factors that result from the systematic approach 
of an investment style. Moreover, because of 
the active nature of most styles, it is important 
to recognise the non-linearity of the risk/return 
proﬁ  le and its implications for the methods used in 
the quantiﬁ  cation and monitoring of the relevant 
relationships. This is illustrated in the chart below 
that shows the relationship between the monthly 
returns of a well-known European long/short 
manager and the EuroStoxx 50 index.
In Chart 3, the red line measures the sensitivity of 
the return to the factor using a linear model; the 
green line uses a piecewise linear model (with slopes 
varying according to the direction of the market –
positive versus negative). This analysis illustrates the 
typical non-linearity (the green is not a straight line) 
in the relationship between the hedge funds return 
and the reference index. This option-like pattern 
is typical of an absolute return manager – e.g. this 
analysis suggests that on average, in the long run, 
this manager loses less money than he gains.
Chart 3
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This regression analysis also allows the identiﬁ  cation 
of the alpha that is made up of ‘pure alpha’, or the 
manager’s skills in selecting securities, as well as 
alternative betas, i.e. normal returns generated from 
an exposure to systematic risks, other than market 
risk. The change in the return proﬁ  le of hedge funds 
is more likely to be due to a change in the value 
added through dynamic betas, which depends on 
the ability of managers to time factors successfully, 
whereas the level of pure alpha is linked to the 
number of opportunities available on the market.
For example, a very common strategy in the 
long/short equity was to have a long exposure to 
small cap equities and a short exposure to large cap 
equity. The sensitivity to this ‘spread’ cannot be well 
captured simply by analysing a small and large cap 
relationship separately. This is because there is a time 
dependent correlation between these two factors that 
is exactly what the fund manager is trying to exploit. 
For technical type strategies, a hedge fund investor 
can construct his own synthetic risk factor – for 
example to describe the return of a long volatility 
style, a simple benchmark can be constructed by 
combining a market index with a basket of options 
with the appropriate pay off structure. For trading, a 
simple benchmark can be constructed by applying a 
classical technical algorithm on a reference market 
index. This type of approach is obviously not suitable 
for all types of investment strategies.
Armed with these tools, a risk manager is in a much 
better position to understand the nature of the 
systematic risk to which he is exposed and to detect 
any potential drifts that are not easily identiﬁ  able 
through a basic analysis based purely on market 
factors.
The critical step in this approach is the ability to 
understand the fundamental nature of the strategy 
of the manager. This is where qualitative expertise 
comes into play.
This approach of systematic beta exposure analysis 
is universal but is irrelevant for some strategies 
that are more driven by market events. However, 
it remains one of the many risk indicators that 
should be analysed, despite its having the limitations 
common to any historical data analysis.
6| ASSET ALLOCATION
Despite all the risks associated with hedge funds 
and the difﬁ   culties of monitoring them, many 
believe such funds can play a constructive role in 
a well-diversiﬁ  ed portfolio and it is here that risk 
management and portfolio management skills come 
into play. Traditional risk management techniques 
such as mean-variance analysis, beta and value-at-risk 
do not fully capture many of the risk exposures of 
hedge fund investments. 
The very ﬁ  rst question –how many hedge funds need 
to be invested in to diversify risk?– requires some 
careful thought given the nature of the risk involved. 
It cannot be answered by simply considering the 
correlation of historical returns because the variance 
and the covariance do not tell the whole story. To 
account for manager speciﬁ  c risk, another risk 
indicator (or maybe more than one other) that is 
more sensitive to the downside risk needs to be 
considered. The downside standard deviation, the 
conditional value-at-risk with or without Cornish 
Fisher expansions or the expected shortfall are good 
candidates. In most cases, there will probably not be 
a simple analytical solution and the answer to this 
simple question will almost certainly require some 
complex simulation analysis with the inevitable 
loss of generality that goes with it. Most simple 
studies suggest a minimum number of hedge funds 
to be in the range of ten to twenty. However, when 
introducing operational risk into the model, this 
number increases to dozens, resulting in a possible 
over-diversiﬁ  cation of the alternative and traditional 
risks and their associated trading costs.
What percentage of a hedge fund portfolio should 
be allocated to a given manager in order to 
maximise the risk/adjusted return and/or satisfy a 
risk-return objective? There is no deﬁ  nite answer 
to this. Traditional asset allocation methodologies 
(mean-variance, capital asset pricing models, 
Black-Litterman methods) suffer from the same 
limitations as when used for traditional asset classes 
(historical bias, instability, complexity etc.). Moreover, 
for a hedge fund portfolio, the additional difﬁ  culty 
in measuring the risk of a portfolio of hedge funds 
and the non-normality of return makes these various ARTICLES
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approaches at best limited and, in most instances, 
inadequate. The answer to this question is still a matter 
of debate between academics and practitioners.
The generation of absolute returns requires an 
in-depth knowledge of alternative styles. Despite 
being referred to often as one single class, hedge fund 
strategies cover an extended range of styles, which 
have little in common with each other. Correlations 
between the various alternative styles are not stable 
and an active asset allocation allows the preservation 
of the risk and return characteristics of a portfolio 
over time. Similar to the long-only universe, this 
active process requires the combination of both a 
top-down and a bottom-up approach. 
The top-down asset allocation starts with the 
identiﬁ  cation of the macro-economic and common 
hedge fund factors, which have an impact on the risk 
and return of individual styles. The factors provide a 
statistical basis for the forecast of each strategy/style 
performance under various economic and market 
scenarios. Once the factors have been identiﬁ  ed, the 
weights to each style, based on the mandate of the 
portfolio, can be allocated. 
A key for the protection of an investor’s capital and 
enhancing return is the active management of the 
asset allocation through a portfolio construction 
process based on those various alternative styles, 
geography and asset classes. As shown in chart 4, 
the distribution of returns is very different from one 
style to another. The management of a multi-strategy 
portfolio requires the blend of various strategies to 
provide a more stable return distribution with a 
higher positive alpha. 
Once the weights have been deﬁ   ned at the portfolio level 
to optimise its risk and return proﬁ  le, it is necessary to 
review and adjust the weights of the managers within 
each style. This can only be successfully achieved 
if hedge funds are properly classiﬁ  ed between the 
various styles, which supposes an in-depth review 
and full understanding of the manager’s investment 
process. The weights by managers are adjusted taking 
into account their risk contribution within the style 
and within the portfolio, their expected returns, based 
on their sensitivity to the style forecasted return and 
a qualitative review of the manager skills.
The bottom-up manager selection starts with the 
screening of the entire hedge fund universe to 
identify attractive new managers, which have then 
to be classiﬁ  ed according to the identiﬁ  ed styles. 
Based on the initial assessment and categorisation, 
a full due diligence process is set up in order to 
review in detail the qualitative, quantitative, legal 
and operational robustness of the manager.
Chart 4
Gaussian and non gaussian distribution
(%)
Arbitrage
High probability of small gains but 
potential to occasionally have large losses.
Hedged Trading
Higher probability of lower performances 




Not dependent on any one factor.
αARTICLES
Patrick Stevenson: “Fund of hedge funds: origins, role and future”
158  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds • No. 10 • April 2007
A challenging step following the top-down asset 
allocation and the bottom-up manager selection is 
the reconciliation of the two processes in order to 
build a robust portfolio. The main challenge is to 
assess to what extent the risk, return and correlation 
forecasted for the style indices during the top-down 
asset allocation can be applied to the individual 
managers identiﬁ  ed by the bottom-up selection. 
The more precise the deﬁ  nition of the styles and the 
more detailed the categorisation of the manager, the 
more accurate and robust will be the extrapolation 
of the forecasts from the indices to the managers. 
This is critical as it allows one to assume limited 
divergence between the managers and the relevant 
indices and to model the relationship using a linear 
equation under a single index model.
The robustness of any asset allocation model can 
obviously only be guaranteed by a regular review 
of both the top-down and the bottom-up processes. 
As correlations between styles are not stable, it is 
important to review the macro-economic and hedge 
fund factors regularly in order to adjust the style’s 
weight and to preserve in the long term the portfolio 
performance. Similarly, managers within the portfolio 
have to be reviewed closely and on a regular basis to 
ensure that hedge funds do not drift from their original 
style and that their risk and return characteristics are 
in line with what is expected, i.e. that the manager 
does not signiﬁ  cantly underperform his peers.
A useful tool for the manager review is to monitor 
abnormality or red ﬂ  ags. It is up to the investor to 
deﬁ  ne these red ﬂ  ags and to put in place a monitoring 
process. These could be, for example, abnormal 
returns, a sudden increase in the fund’s volatility, 
too large price discrepancies between estimates 
and ﬁ  nal prices (for funds which provide estimated 
performance), or a large change in the hedge fund 
assets under management. Interestingly, most if not 
all hedge fund failures have happened to hedge funds, 
which have previously posted some outstanding 
risk-adjusted performance. Understanding how 
performers have achieved their best results is probably 
as important, if not more important, than worrying 
about their worst ones. When something looks too 
good, it is a good time to wonder if this is not indeed 
too good to be true, especially if a due diligence has 
raised issues about the pricing methodology used in 
valuing the fund assets. There is also the qualitative 
monitoring: change in service providers (such as the 
administrator or the prime broker) or change of fund 
terms (liquidity, fees etc.).
The limitation of the red ﬂ  ag approach is that when 
an abnormality is identiﬁ  ed, it can sometimes be 
too late to be acted upon. This is why a hedge fund 
investor must have not just one but as many risk 
indicators as possible to enable him to make a wise 
and informed judgment.
7| REPORTING
Investing in hedge funds is not a free lunch. 
Committing money to this asset class is no guarantee of 
absolute returns. A successful alternative investment 
is more likely to be made in several hedge funds, 
allowing for a sufﬁ  cient level of diversiﬁ  cation by 
managers and across alternative strategies.
For many years, funds of hedge funds have been 
criticised for the poor quality of their reporting, 
which focused on comparing returns to a benchmark 
(often a market index), using indicators designed 
for the long-only universe, such as the Sharpe ratio. 
Thanks to the institutionalisation of the industry, 
the transparency of hedge funds has improved and 
managers are keener to disclose speciﬁ  c information, 
such as their various risk exposures, etc.
Despite this increased transparency, it would be 
a delusion to believe that producing a report on a 
portfolio of hedge funds is an easy task. The complexity 
and non-linearity of risks to which hedge funds are 
exposed cannot be assessed through traditional tools, 
because using those tools can lead to a signiﬁ  cant 
underestimation of the risks associated to alternative 
strategies. Therefore these strategies require the use 
of more advanced indicators, such as style VaR, the 
Omega ratio, conditional beta analysis, etc.
Moreover, even within the same strategy, not all 
hedge funds communicate the same indicators 
to their investors, nor in the same manner. 
For instance, it would not be possible to compare 
correlation analyses if they were not calculated 
versus the same market index, over the same period 
and using the same frequency of data (daily, weekly, 
monthly, etc.). The production of a usable report 
requires infrastructure, as it requires the collection, ARTICLES
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combination and interpretation of information 
received from the various managers.
Over the past few years, investors have been made 
aware of the importance of transparency when 
investing in the alternative universe, increasing 
their requirement for more detailed reporting on 
their investments. The main challenge facing fund 
of hedge fund managers is to produce reports that 
provide clear evidence of the value added and that 
meet the needs of their clients. For instance, there 
are no ofﬁ  cial deﬁ  nitions of the various hedge fund 
styles, and the categorisation of managers between 
the various styles can therefore be affected. Through 
their reporting, fund of hedge funds can help the 
investor to reﬁ  ne their deﬁ  nition of the various styles 
and improve their understanding of the alternative 
universe. They can also develop customised reporting, 
according to the speciﬁ  c needs of their investors 
(e.g. identiﬁ  cation of speciﬁ  c risk exposures depending 
on the characteristics of the overall portfolio, i.e. both 
alternative and traditional allocation).
8| CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
Hedge funds have been recognised since the 1980s 
for their ability to generate returns in excess of other 
asset classes. According to traditional performance 
attribution models, the part of the return that 
does not come from the rewards of market risk is 
considered to be alpha, or the manager skills that 
generate return in excess of the market. Due to the 
lack of transparency in hedge funds, it was difﬁ  cult 
to identify the various risk exposures that they 
took, and most of their returns were considered as 
alpha. As academic research and transparency have 
progressed, hedge fund returns have been broken 
down into other sources of return and the portion of 
unexplained return, or alpha, has sharply decreased. 
However, alpha generation remains a corner stone 
in the hedge fund industry.
The capacity constraint issue ﬁ  rst emerged with the 
need to identify managers able to generate alpha over 
a long period. Performance comparisons between 
hedge funds with a short track record and usually 
with small assets under management, and older funds 
with larger assets, highlight the overperformance of 
the former group of managers. Similarly, a manager 
will tend to generate higher return in the earlier 
years of his performance. However, those results 
should be put into context, as market conditions can 
signiﬁ  cantly differ between the launch of a fund and 
its later maturity. Moreover, this does not imply that 
a manager with a long track record or large AUM is 
unable to continue to generate alpha.
Hedge funds managers usually deﬁ  ne a maximum 
amount of AUM above which they consider they 
cannot fully implement their investment process 
and therefore generate alpha. As soon as this amount 
is reached, the fund is closed to new investment. 
Depending on the strategy, this amount can be 
limited to two hundred million dollars (e.g. ABL 
specialised hedge funds) or several billion dollars 
(e.g. global macro managers). From the investor’s 
point of view, a closed hedge fund means not only 
a manager able to generate alpha on a consistent 
basis, but also a fund to which it is obviously almost 
impossible to gain access. Funds of hedge funds, 
due to the large range and long-term proﬁ  le of 
their investments, are able to identify managers in 
their early years, while the alpha generation is at 
its maximum, and secure capacity when the fund 
reaches a more mature stage and is closed to new 
investment. Therefore, through their portfolios, 
funds of hedge funds are able to offer exposure to a 
long-term alpha-generating pool of managers.
Over recent years and with the declining returns 
of hedge funds, a new concern has emerged – that 
the capacity constraint shown at manager level has 
been extended to the overall hedge fund industry, 
with only a ﬁ  xed amount of alpha available in the 
alternative universe. The large inﬂ  ow of assets and 
the increased number of hedge funds would therefore 
reduce the alpha generated by each manager.
As described earlier, the pure alpha (i.e. stock selection) 
component accounts only for a limited part of a hedge 
fund return, while the active alternative beta timing 
constitutes the largest part of what is commonly called 
alpha. The overall amount of opportunities available 
in the market cannot be increased indeﬁ  nitely and 
this could limit the production of pure alpha by 
hedge fund managers. However, regarding alternative 
betas, there is currently no clear evidence that new 
and existing managers are any less able than in the 
past. Even if the capacity of a manager to forecast 
trends and time factors can be affected by the market 
environment, it is not possible to conclude that this 
capacity has a tendency to decline with the increase ARTICLES
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in the number of participants. The importance of beta 
timing as a way of generating excess return in the 
long term should be noted.
While the capacity constraint at the manager level 
is an issue for investors, the capacity constraint at 
the industry level is a myth. Funds of hedge funds 
can provide a solution to the capacity constraint at 
the manager level, by investing in new managers 
and securing investment capacity with closed funds. 
Nevertheless, the most important role of funds of hedge 
funds related to the capacity issue is the alternative 
beta identiﬁ  cation and their ability to build portfolios 
diversiﬁ  ed across the various risk exposures.
9| THE FUTURE
In the main, the future of funds of hedge funds 
depends on two factors: the continued growth 
of absolute returns in satisfying institutional 
requirements and the continued commitment 
from funds of hedge funds to adding value and 
constructing superior institutional portfolios.
The growth of institutional investment in hedge 
funds, directly or indirectly, seems set to continue 
at least at the same pace as in the past so long as 
the capacity for alternative and active investment 
styles continues to expand sufﬁ  ciently and sustain 
growth in the AUM of multi managers operating in 
the alternative space. In other words, with close 
to 5% of the institutional pool of money invested 
today in alternative investments, the point of 
no return has been reached and the process of 
shifting from relative returns to absolute returns is 
irreversible. Such a trend is well illustrated by the 
increasing number of RFPs (requests for proposal) 
being despatched by institutions worldwide, and 
by the large inﬂ  ux of new types of clients, such as 
pension funds, entering the alternative space and 
contributing to its expansion.
As to the second, the commitment of funds of 
hedge funds in continuing to add value can be 
best reﬂ  ected by the fact that, while they have 
so far been successful in generating absolute 
returns from decorrelated alpha, their ambition 
has, over the last ﬁ  ve years, broadened to include 
market-related returns. Indeed hedge funds were the 
ﬁ  rst to introduce market beta into their portfolio and 
capture market returns whenever appropriate. For 
example, several hedge fund managers have made it 
known that they will expand their long-only portfolio 
and reduce the proportion of their short positions. 
This evolution has not gone unnoticed by fund of 
hedge fund managers who, as a consequence, have 
had to integrate market directionality into their 
asset allocation model. In fact, the experience 
acquired in understanding and evaluating the role 
of skills in producing absolute returns, proved also 
of value when applied to the traditional space and 
contributed to broadening the added value of the 
multi managers’ institutional proposition. Now that 
funds of hedge funds have become fully-ﬂ  edged 
multi managers in their own right, they should be 
able to compete in the institutional sector and accept 
(as is their obligation) the responsibilities that go 
with that position.